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Executive summary 
 
This report provides a summary and overview of the findings from research commissioned by the 
Department of Health’s Policy Research Programme to investigate the development and implementation of 
medical revalidation in England, and its impact on organisational performance and medical practice.     
The purpose of revalidation, articulated by the Department of Health, General Medical Council, Royal 
Colleges and other stakeholders in various policy documents from 2007 to 2012, was essentially twofold – 
to assure patients, the public, employers and others that doctors are up to date and fit to practise; and to 
improve performance both by dealing with poor performance and improving professional standards and 
practice overall. The introduction of medical revalidation has been an important opportunity for research 
which can inform and support policy and practice in health professions’ regulation in the UK and 
internationally.  The findings are of interest not just in relation to the medical profession in the UK, but also 
to other health professions in the UK and to stakeholders in health professions’ regulation in many other 
jurisdictions. 
We find that the introduction of medical revalidation has fundamentally changed the way that the medical 
profession is regulated in the United Kingdom, creating a new tripartite relationship between the General 
Medical Council, organisations which employ or contract with doctors, and the medical profession 
(individually and collectively).  We describe this as an employer-mediated professional regulatory regime.    
It has required many healthcare organisations to strengthen (or establish) systems for clinical governance 
and their oversight of medical performance.  Our key findings are: 
 Overall, the implementation of medical revalidation and the many organisational and professional 
changes associated with it has been achieved, at around the costs anticipated by the Department of 
Health.   We found while there was initial resistance to and concern about medical revalidation, that 
has largely reduced as doctors and healthcare organisations have engaged with its practical 
implementation constructively, though there is significant residual scepticism about the process and its 
benefits. 
 Revalidation as it was designed has been easiest to implement in quite large healthcare organisations 
(like NHS trusts) where the capacity and capability for clinical governance already existed or could be 
provided, and where most doctors have a fairly straightforward employed relationship with the 
organisation. 
 Revalidation has been more problematic to implement in smaller healthcare organisations (like 
hospices or private healthcare providers which lacked capacity and capability in clinical governance), in 
primary care (where NHS England area teams have been expected to manage revalidation for very large 
    
Page 3 
 
numbers of GPs without the supporting governance infrastructures found in NHS trusts) and for doctors 
whose relationship to organisations is generally more distant or transient. 
 The role of “designated bodies” (the formal term for organisations which employ or contract with 
doctors) and of Responsible Officers has been crucial to the effective implementation of revalidation.  
Although the regulations give significant statutory responsibilities to Responsible Officers, who are 
accountable professionally, as doctors, to the General Medical Council, they do not provide for the 
corporate accountability of designated bodies for revalidation, or provide any powers for the GMC or 
others to determine which organisations have the capacity to become or remain a designated body. 
 Particular areas of concern include the oversight of locum doctors and of doctors working in private 
practice, and of doctors who move frequently between healthcare organisations.   In these groups, it is 
often not clear who is responsible for appraisal, revalidation and remediation or how these processes 
should be resourced.    The sharing of information about appraisal and revalidation for these doctors 
between organisations is generally quite limited.  Paradoxically, strengthened clinical governance in 
many healthcare organisations could encourage some doctors to move to these settings where there is 
less effective oversight of clinical practice. 
 Our research finds many examples of changes and improvements in clinical governance and clinical 
practice reported by Responsible Officers, particularly in relation to doctors whose practice gives cause 
for concern or where there are problems or concerns about the quality of care.   It is less clear that 
revalidation has had much impact on the majority of doctors whose performance is good, in supporting 
or stimulating further improvement. 
 We describe the model of revalidation implemented to date as generic, by which we mean that the 
process is intended to be applicable to all doctors regardless of speciality, work setting, prior 
performance and other characteristics.   We think that this “one size fits all” model had the advantage 
of simplicity, especially in the first cycle of revalidation where relatively little data about the likely 
outcomes of revalidation was available.   However, a generic model is inherently inefficient, and it 
would be preferable to tailor the future use of revalidation to take greater account of factors such as 
specialty/service type, work environment/organisation, and prior performance. 
 Measuring the impact of medical revalidation quantitatively is difficult, not least because much 
performance variation does not relate to doctors individually or to organisations.   We found no 
significant changes in a number of quantitative measures of quality attributable to revalidation for a 
variety of condition/procedure groups.   We did find that the likelihood of consultant medical staff 
leaving the workforce increased significantly as a result of revalidation.   
The Department of Health’s own impact assessment from 2012 predicted the costs of medical revalidation 
conservatively, and was overoptimistic about the benefits to be realised in this first cycle.  Some of the 
benefits predicted are likely only to be measurable over a longer time period that this research allowed. 
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But, on the basis of current evidence, we cannot demonstrate that medical revalidation as implemented is 
a cost-effective policy intervention. 
 
The General Medical Council commissioned a review of medical revalidation from Sir Keith Pearson, which 
was published in early 2017, and has just published an action plan in response to that review.  From our 
research, we would suggest four main areas in which future improvements to medical revalidation might 
concentrate: 
 
 Healthcare organisations (“designated bodies” as they are referred to in the regulations) are crucial to 
the effective use of medical revalidation, but they vary hugely in size, capability and capacity, and 
approaches to medical revalidation.   At the moment there is no mechanism for determining what 
organisations can or should take on this statutory role.  In theory at least, any organisation which 
employs or contracts with a doctor or doctors can be a designated body, though some organisations 
(NHS trusts for example) are required to be designated bodies by the regulations.   Neither the GMC 
nor the Department of Health seems to have formal responsibility for maintaining a list of designated 
bodies.   We suggest that a central authority should have statutory responsibility for setting the criteria 
or requirements to be met in order to be a designated body, determining whether an organisation 
fulfils those requirements, and maintaining the register or list of designated bodies.   
 Doctors who do not work in a conventional, employed relationship for one large healthcare 
organisation or designated body are not well served by the current arrangements for medical 
revalidation.   This includes locums, doctors in private practice, doctors with no “prescribed 
connection” to a designated body, and arguably doctors in general practice who are all revalidated by 
NHS England.   We suggest that new arrangements for the oversight of doctors in these groups are 
needed, which take greater account of the relatively limited clinical governance infrastructure around 
them.   It may be that some organisations not currently acting as designated bodies (CCGs or GP 
federations for example in primary care) should take on that role.  
 A substantial amount of information about appraisal and revalidation is collected at an organisational 
level, but virtually none of it – beyond the revalidation recommendation – is held by the General 
Medical Council, and information is not reliably shared when doctors move between organisations.  In 
Scotland and Wales there are  information systems for appraisal and revalidation (MARS and SOAR) for 
all doctors in those two countries.  We suggest that the use of a single information system could make 
appraisal and revalidation more efficient for doctors and designated bodies, support information 
sharing when doctors move from one organisation to another or work for multiple organisations, and 
make it more feasible for appraisal and revalidation to cover doctors’ whole scope of practice.  It would 
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also help to support doctors who, as noted above, do not work within a single designated body and its 
clinical governance infrastructure. 
 We have noted that the current generic model of revalidation takes little account of differences 
between doctors’ areas of clinical practice or their specialty, organisational context, and prior or 
current performance.  We argued that generic regulatory interventions tend, by their very nature, to be 
quite inefficient, and we noted that the impact to date of revalidation seems to have been largely at 
the lower end of the performance continuum.  We suggest that revalidation could be made a more 
flexible process, with greater capacity for designated bodies and their Responsible Officers to be 
responsive to differences in specialty/clinical practice area, organisational/work context, and 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
This report provides a summary and overview of the findings from research commissioned by the 
Department of Health’s Policy Research Programme to investigate the development and implementation of 
medical revalidation in England, and its impact on organisational performance and medical practice. It is 
supported by a number of separate working papers, which report on specific work packages or projects 
within the research, and which are listed in Appendix A.     
This overview report has five main sections.  First, it outlines the background to the research, briefly 
reprising the research aims and questions from the proposal and outlining the four main work packages 
within the project.   There then follow three sections which summarise our findings on the policy aims and 
underlying mechanisms of medical revalidation; the implementation and processes of medical revalidation; 
and the impact and cost of medical revalidation in England.  Finally, we draw together our conclusions and 
reflection on the lessons from the research for future directions in medical revalidation. 
 
2. Background: researching medical revalidation 
The introduction of medical revalidation has been an important opportunity for research which can inform 
and support policy and practice in health professions’ regulation in the UK and internationally. The central 
policy problem – how to provide assurance that health professionals are fit to practise throughout their 
careers and are encouraged as professionals to maintain and improve their standards of practice – is one of 
great interest not just in relation to the medical profession in the UK, but also to other health professions in 
the UK and to stakeholders in health professions’ regulation in many other jurisdictions. 
Medical revalidation was introduced in December 2012 after more than a decade of policy development 
and debate about how to assure the continuing fitness to practice of doctors in the United Kingdom.  Put 
simply, it requires all doctors in clinical practice to demonstrate on a regular basis that they are up to date 
and fit to practise in their chosen field and able to provide a good level of care.   It involves doctors 
collecting a portfolio of supporting information about their practice and reflecting upon it, and undergoing 
an annual appraisal based around the requirements of the GMC’s standards set out in Good Medical 
Practice.  Organisations which employ or contract with doctors are required to appoint a medically 
qualified Responsible Officer, who has a range of statutory responsibilities for the oversight of medical 
performance, including managing the revalidation process and making a revalidation recommendation to 
the General Medical Council about each doctor usually once every five years.  If a doctor is not revalidated, 
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they may lose their licence to practise medicine.  The introduction of revalidation is perhaps the most 
fundamental reform to medical regulation of recent years, and it has significantly changed the relationships 
and lines of accountability between individual doctors, healthcare organisations and the General Medical 
Council.  It is a controversial reform which is still somewhat contested within the profession.  There has 
been a continuing debate about the likely effects or impacts of medical revalidation, and its capacity both 
to detect and remedy poor performance and to support and encourage wider improvements in 
performance. 
We identified six main research questions to be addressed in this project, which cover the three main 
themes outlined above – mechanisms by which revalidation could work; the implementation and processes 
of revalidation; and the impacts and costs of revalidation. The research questions are: 
1. What are the main organisational determinants of medical performance, and how is the development 
of revalidation expected to affect or change those determinants? 
2. What is the underlying programme theory (or theories) for the development of revalidation and its 
incorporation into existing systems for managing medical performance in healthcare organisations? 
3. How is revalidation actually implemented in healthcare organisations – and how does this process of 
implementation reflect or shape the identified programme theory/theories? What are the experiences, 
lessons and views of key stakeholders in implementation (such as healthcare organisations/leaders, 
appraisers, appraisees, and other key actors such as educators, professional associations, etc)? 
4. How does revalidation influence or change the management of instances of suboptimal medical 
performance in healthcare organisations? 
5. What are the costs of the implementation of revalidation, and how do different models or approaches 
to implementation affect overall costs and the distribution of costs? 
6. What impact do revalidation and related systems have on medical performance? Are levels and 
variations in performance at an individual or organisational level partly explained by revalidation and 
related systems for managing medical performance? 
We have undertaken our research in four main “workpackages” – subprojects or components of the 
research, designed to address these research questions.  They are summarised in table 1 below, which 
shows which of the above research questions they address, and what fieldwork and data analysis we have 
undertaken. 
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Table 1.  Summary of research project workpackages 
WP1 – Review of 
existing research and 
evidence, and 
stakeholder 
engagement (RQs 1, 2) 
 
This work package sought a clear, shared understanding of the 
mechanisms for revalidation in organisations and their place within wider 
systems for managing medical performance. It provided a secure 
theoretical grounding and framework for fieldwork in subsequent work 
packages. We undertook a review of relevant literature and existing 
evidence; a policy analysis using documents from 2010 to 2016; and over 
70 interviews with key stakeholders in three phases in 2011, 2013 and 
2015. 
WP2 – implementation 
of revalidation: national 
surveys and 
organisational case 
studies(RQs 3, 5, 6) 
 
This work package has developed a detailed understanding of the 
implementation of revalidation in healthcare organisations in England, 
framed by the programme theories developed in WP1. There were three 
main fieldwork components of this workpackage: two national surveys of 
all designated bodies (DBs) in England; the selection of 12 DBs as case 
study organisations; detailed qualitative research in each case study 
organisation using interviews and documents. 
WP3 – the 
management of 
suboptimal medical 
practice: organisational 
case studies and cohort 
study (RQs 3, 4, 6) 
This workpackage examined how revalidation and existing mechanisms 
for managing medical performance are enacted in relation to doctors 
whose performance is seen as giving cause for concern and whose fitness 
to practise may be impaired.  We used interviews in case study 
organisations and NHS England, and a cohort study of about 100 cases of 
concern in primary care. 
WP4 – the impact of 
revalidation on medical 
performance (RQ 1, 4, 
5, 6) 
 
This work package assessed the impact of revalidation in terms of its 
wider effects on individual and organisational performance, potential 
unintended consequences and the costs of implementation. We examined 
the impact of revalidation and related systems for managing medical 
performance through a quantitative analysis of secondary data sources in 
NHS acute care looking both at individual level and organisational level 
effects, and linking to data from the General Medical Council on dates and 
outcomes of revalidation for consultants.    We used multi-level risk 
adjustment models, difference in difference and interrupted time series 
analysis. 
 
3. The purpose of revalidation: policy objectives and policy development 
The purpose of revalidation, articulated by the Department of Health, General Medical Council, Royal 
Colleges and other stakeholders in various policy documents from 2007 to 2012, is essentially twofold – to 
assure patients, the public, employers and others that doctors are up to date and fit to practise; and to 
improve performance both by dealing with poor performance and improving professional standards and 
practice overall.  In its cost-benefit analysis of the proposed medical revalidation reforms (Department of 
Health 2012), the Department of Health set out six anticipated benefits: 
 Increased public trust and confidence in doctors; 
 Improved patient safety, outcomes and quality of care; 
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 A reduction in the costs of support for the minority of doctors whose medical practice is poor, 
through earlier identification of performance issues; 
 A reduction in malpractice and litigation costs; 
 Improvement in the quality of information about medical care; and 
 Supporting positive cultural change in the medical profession. 
It is clear that medical revalidation was intended to bring about improvements in medical performance, 
leading to improved patient safety, outcomes, and quality of care and hence to increased public trust and 
confidence in doctors, but less clear how those changes were expected to come about. In this section we 
examine the literature on medical performance and use economic theory to hypothesise how revalidation 
might change performance; we review the policy literature (reports and other documents from 
government, the General Medical Council and other organisations) to understand how the policy 
developed; and we draw on about 70 interviews with key stakeholders who were involved in policy 
development. 
3.1 Revalidation and medical performance: a conceptual model 
We undertook a literature review, using the definition of medical performance contained in the General 
Medical Council’s (GMC) guidance for doctors, titled Good Medical Practice, which articulates four 
performance dimensions or domains – knowledge, skills and performance; safety and quality; 
communication, partnership and teamwork;  and maintaining trust.  These are the things we regard as 
“performance outcomes”.    We explored the contextual factors which might shape, determine or influence 
medical performance, and the performance management systems or mechanisms which exist in healthcare 
organisations, and what evidence there is for how they work or for their impact or effect on medical 
performance.     The resulting model is set out below in figure 1. 
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Figure1.  A conceptual model of medical performance 
 
Our purpose here is to understand how the implementation of medical revalidation might work to change 
this model of medical performance – what effects revalidation could have on the contexts, mechanisms and 
performance outcomes outlined in the model. 
We conclude that the implementation of medical revalidation is not simply a change to the way the medical 
profession is regulated.   Firstly, it introduces for the first time a formal statutory role in professional 
regulation for healthcare organisations as employers.  By requiring organisations which employ or contract 
with doctors to appoint a suitably qualified doctor as their Responsible Officer, and giving that person a 
range of statutory responsibilities concerned with clinical governance including the making of revalidation 
recommendations to the General Medical Council, the policy effectively extends professional regulation by 
co-opting the employer to the purposes and processes of regulation, even though the General Medical 
Council has no formal statutory powers over healthcare organisations.   This is a particularly interesting 
innovation – it effectively creates an employer-mediated professional regulatory regime.    
Secondly, the implementation of revalidation requires doctors to undergo an annual process of appraisal 
(the outcomes of which are used together with other material by the Responsible Officer to make the 
revalidation recommendation), and the General Medical Council’s detailed guidance on supporting 
information requirements for appraisal requires doctors to provide information in six areas, and effectively 
requires healthcare organisations to have systems in place which will produce this information.  Again, 
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though the General Medical Council has no statutory powers over healthcare organisations, the 
introduction of revalidation effectively mandates the use of certain organisational systems for managing 
medical performance. 
Measuring changes in medical performance outcomes and then ascribing them to medical revalidation 
(isolating them from other contemporaneous changes to medical staff training/development, careers, pay 
and conditions, service organisation, institutional arrangements etc) is rather problematic, not least 
because the causal chain is difficult to establish. We should be very cautious about attributing such changes 
to medical revalidation (or conversely concluding if we do not find change that medical revalidation has not 
worked).  Changes in systems and processes, which may be easier both to measure and to associate 
causally with the introduction of medical revalidation, should be given equal prominence in seeking to 
understand and evaluate the impact of medical revalidation. 
3.2 Predicting the effects of medical revalidation on medical performance 
In order to think about how the performance outcomes set out in our model in figure 1 might change with 
the implementation of revalidation, it is helpful to consider the hypothetical distribution of performance 
shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2.  The hypothetical continuum of medical performance 
 
This assumes that performance varies across a continuum (in our example the distribution is slightly 
skewed with a long tail of lower quality performing doctors).  We also suppose that a minimum threshold 
can be specified such that there should be no doctors practising whose performance falls below this 
threshold – that is the dotted line on the figure, and the area to the left of that threshold is shaded.  
Physician Human Capital
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Leaving aside issues like how this threshold should be established, there is a problem in that this 
distribution will typically be difficult for organisations or regulators to measure.  Individual doctors 
themselves may have a clearer knowledge of where they lie on the continuum, though they too may not 
have perfect knowledge.  Without any knowledge of the distribution of performance, doctors below the 
threshold would be able to carry on practising.   
The process of revalidation, collecting objective evidence on physician performance and training should 
help regulators form an evidence-based estimate of this distribution.  Even if revalidation is sufficiently well 
designed to capture the whole distribution, however, the simple process of measurement itself may not 
change the distribution.  There might be some intervention that targets those doctors below the threshold 
such that their performance is increased to a point above the threshold.  This might involve further training 
and would probably incur some costs and take some time to be effective.  Nevertheless the impact of 
measurement plus intervention may be sufficient to change the distribution of physician performance and 
have a positive impact on the subsequent distribution of patient outcomes.  In addition, revalidation could 
cause doctors in the main body of the distribution to improve their performance.  That is, although they are 
not below the threshold, nor are they perceived as being in any real danger of being below the threshold, it  
may still cause them to address any limitations identified in their own performance.  Thus it is possible the 
whole distribution may shift to the right rather than just the tail-end of lower quality.  Although this shift in 
distribution may be very small, as it potentially affects the larger group of doctors, the magnitude of impact 
could be quite large. 
Alternatively, some doctors may choose to leave the workforce.  This may occur before, during or after the 
revalidation process.  If, for example, doctors have a good idea of their own performance and where they 
are in relationship to the threshold, then in anticipation of failing to meet the minimum threshold they may 
choose to leave the workforce. This may include doctors who may be on the ‘right’ side of the threshold if 
they are close to the threshold and have imperfect knowledge.  Furthermore, the revalidation process itself 
may impose costs on the individual doctors – time spent on administrative tasks, stress, etc.  At the margin, 
these additional costs may also influence the decisions of doctors to continue in practice or leave. Thus 
there may be a second impact which affects not necessarily the quality of the medical performance but the 
quantity.   
Figure 3 shows these potential impacts of revalidation on the medical performance: 1) improvement in the 
tail; 2) general rightwards shift of distribution and 3) a reduction in overall volume via labour market exit 
from distribution either side of the threshold.  
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Figure 3. The hypothetical continuum of medical performance after the introduction of revalidation 
 
3.3 Policy development: ambition and realism 
We undertook a review of policy documents published from 2010-2016, to seek to understand how the 
policy on revalidation had been developed before and after the implementation of medical revalidation 
commenced in 2012.   Our review identified 114 revalidation policy documents over this period, including 
24 from governmental and parliamentary sources; 23 from the General Medical Council (GMC); 12 from 
National Health Service (NHS) national agencies; and 55 from the medical Royal Colleges and professional 
associations.  We also interviewed a range of policymakers and senior leaders to understand their views of 
medical revalidation and its implementation – 71 interviews with 60 individuals were conducted at three 
points in time: 2011 (n=31), 2013 (n=26) and 2015 (n=14). Interviewees were drawn from the Department 
of Health, General Medical Council, Royal Colleges, professional associations, employer associations and a 
range of other stakeholders.     
We found that the focus of the policy debate shifted over time from the establishment of revalidation 
policy and principles in 2010 to the discussions concerned with implementation from 2012 onwards, to a 
greater focus on impact and evaluation from 2015 onwards, as discourses concerning the revision or 
refinement of revalidation emerged.  As one might expect there were discernible differences between the 
perspectives of the different stakeholders –the GMC tended to focus on the regulatory statutory function, 
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government and NHS agencies were concerned with the wider systems of accountability and quality 
assurance, while the Royal Colleges were primarily interested in issues relating to the quality of 
care/practice and professional development.   These differing perspectives are highlighted because over 
time we observed a shift in ownership and responsibility for revalidation and its implementation – with the 
medical Royal Colleges becoming less influential and more marginal to revalidation, and the General 
Medical Council and, to some extent, the Department of Health and national NHS agencies taking the 
leading roles in its development and implementation.   
We also observed a gradual “drawing in” of the ambitions for revalidation – a narrowing of scope, and 
some lowering of expectations over time.   Before 2012, this was most obviously demonstrated by the 
decision not to have dual relicensing and recertification arrangements with Royal College set standards and 
appointed advisors and to move to a more generic and arguably less demanding set of standards for 
revalidation, but it is also seen in the policy discourse as a shift from ambitions to improve clinical practice 
across the profession to an increasing focus on getting revalidation established and accepted successfully, 
albeit with a relatively low bar for this first cycle of revalidation.  It is also notable that some difficult or 
problematic issues in revalidation – for example, the nature of local organisations and Responsible Officers 
and the way they would enact their role, and the implementation of revalidation for doctors who were not 
in a straightforward employed relationship with a single organisation such as those in sessional, portfolio or 
locum roles – were raised early in the policy process and discussed but essentially not resolved, and they 
resurface as concerns repeatedly over time, including in the most recent review of revalidation undertaken 
for the GMC in 2016. 
We found from our interviews that two discourses were present across the period from 2010 to 2016: 
professionalism (emphasising formative, development review and improvement drawing on professional 
traditions of peer review and self-regulation) and regulation (focused more on summative assessment, 
accountability and meeting performance expectations). However, the nature of the relationship between 
the two purposes and the way they were described by interviewees changed over time, with the separate 
discourses converging, and early concerns about actual or potential conflict being replaced by perceptions 
of co-existence or even co-dependency.  It seems that the experience of “doing” revalidation led 
stakeholders to find they could at least co-exist without too much dissonance in practice.   Indeed, some 
stakeholders began to see the dichotomy between professional and regulatory purposes as somewhat 
artificial, and to argue that dealing with concerns about poor practice and seeking to improve professional 
standards were complementary and even co-dependent.   
Our interviews suggested that the key actors in revalidation, such as responsible officers and appraisers, 
had committed to the policy and its implementation but were not always supported by adequate resources 
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and infrastructure.  Cultural resistance and hierarchical boundaries and traditions meant not all doctors 
were willing to work with others for the purposes of revalidation, and some doctors reportedly felt that 
revalidation diminished their professional status and positioned them as more like other employees. But 
again, it seemed that these cultural changes were becoming normalised, in part through new doctors more 
familiar and comfortable with reflective practice entering the profession. 
Most interviewees noted that it was not the principle of revalidation that was in contention but rather the 
difficulties or challenges encountered in integrating it into working practices.  There was evidence that the 
sense makers of revalidation within organisations were starting to think about how the process of 
implementation had unfolded, both to highlight problems and to suggest improvements. Revalidation was 
discussed as “a work in progress”, needing improvement but now accepted by the majority of doctors.  
4. Implementing medical revalidation: systems and processes 
 
We conducted an online survey of all Responsible Officers (ROs) in the UK between June and  September 
2015.  We wanted to map how revalidation had actually been implemented by designated bodies (DBs), 
and how it had interacted with other organisational systems for managing medical performance.  We got 
responses from 374 out of 595 ROs surveyed (response rate 63%).    We conducted a second survey of 
Responsible Officers (ROs) in England between November 2016 and January 2017. This secured responses 
from 327 of 521 ROs surveyed (response rate 63%).    We also conducted a qualitative study of the 
implementation and running of revalidation across a wide range of 12 case study sites, chosen to represent 
a range of different NHS and non-NHS organisations.  In 2016 and 2017 we undertook a total of 84 
interviews with clinical and non-clinical staff involved or connected to revalidation. 
4.1 Revalidation: initial implementation 
Our first survey found that Responsible Officers believed that revalidation had driven improvements in the 
use and sharing of information about medical performance within many organisations.  This had been 
principally focused on appraisal as the mechanism whereby information is brought together, considered 
and used to inform revalidation recommendations.  We found that 85% of respondents to the survey 
perceived that the appraisal system in their designated body had changed; mostly for the better.  
Improvements in other systems for managing medical performance (continuing professional 
development/CPD, complaints, quality improvement, significant events/serious untoward incidents, 
doctors causing concern and fitness to practise) had also occurred, but had been less widespread.  Almost 
half of respondents’ designated bodies were reported to have improved their systems in relation to doctors 
causing concern, and almost 40% were reported to have improved CPD. 
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Information sharing between organisations and the General Medical Council about doctor performance 
also seems to have improved, with the GMC’s Employer Liaison Service in particular providing better, 
earlier and more timely access to advice.  Over 93% of respondents had contacted ELS advisors, and over 
70% of these had found this very useful.  It was not clear however that revalidation had driven a similar 
improvement in information sharing between organisations.  Respondents commonly reported difficulties 
in obtaining performance information about doctors such as locums, who work across more than one DB or 
about doctors when they move from one DB to another. 
We found that the design of revalidation was best suited to larger organisations with a substantial pre-
existing clinical governance infrastructure.  Smaller designated bodies in particular found revalidation 
onerous and a strain on their resources and capabilities.  Many ROs had added revalidation to their existing 
leadership responsibilities without having sufficient additional hours allocated to this activity by their 
organisation. 
Very few Responsible Officers wanted to see a reversal of policy on medical revalidation, but many thought 
it could be made more effective and efficient, and there were some clear and consistent messages about 
how that might be achieved.  Moving from a “one size fits all” single model of revalidation to allow some 
legitimate and appropriate variation in the way the policy is applied seemed to have widespread support.  
This could mean differences in the way it worked with organisations with many or few employed doctors; 
with organisations where there was a close or more distant relationship with employed doctors; with 
doctors in different fields or specialties due to the clinical content and nature of their work; and perhaps 
most controversially with individual doctors according to their past and current performance track record. 
It was very difficult to answer the question of what impact medical revalidation had had or would have on 
clinical practice and the quality of medical care from our first survey.   There were some early indications 
that the impact so far was mostly focused on identifying and remediating poor performance, and there was 
more to be done to ensure that revalidation has benefits and impact for doctors who perform well already. 
4.2 Revalidation: making progress 
Our second survey in 2016/17 focused on a number of areas of interest, such as quality assurance of 
appraisals and revalidation, communication between ROs about individual doctors, locum doctors, private 
practice, patient and public involvement, external revalidation services and outsourcing of revalidation, 
changes and future improvements to revalidation, and the impact of revalidation.  
The quality of appraisals was thought to be dependent on a number of factors, including the appraiser 
being a medical doctor with formal training in medical appraisal for revalidation. A variety of issues that 
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may have implications for the quality and consistency of appraisals were identified, such as a perceived lack 
of consistent guidelines, pressures on resources, appraiser recruitment and retention, information flow and 
doctor engagement in the process. A number of conditions were thought to be necessary to improve the 
implementation of appraisal, these included, for example; quality assurance of appraisal process and 
appraiser, appraisee and appraiser buy in, inclusion of full scope of practice, good resources and 
administrative support, good appraisal management systems, and a supportive and open culture. 
Methods of communication between responsible officers varied and were dependent upon the motive for 
communication, and substantial discretionary effort on the part of ROs. The Medical Practice Information 
Transfer (MPIT) form (or similar) was used to communicate information when doctors moved between 
organisations, but we found a lack of consistency in how frequently it was used and concerns about 
limitations of the form. ROs reported that they used other channels of communication for more complex 
cases, or where there were performance concerns.   
We found that locum working and private practice represent weak links in the oversight of regulation and 
clinical governance. Revalidation guidelines had not sufficiently considered the practicalities of 
implementation in the locum workforce and private practice, leading to ambiguity about who was 
responsible for overseeing these doctors and some confusion about how to implement the policy. 
Participants reported poor transfer of information between different settings, and a lack of confidence in 
the robustness of information provided, making it difficult to oversee the performance of locums and the 
private practice of doctors.  Specifically, locums were highlighted as a point of weakness in systems for 
communication and for investigating concerns. ROs reported that it was difficult to track and investigate 
concerns because of the transient nature of locum working. There was ambiguity about who was 
responsible for reporting information and carrying out investigations, which meant that concerns about 
locums were sometimes not communicated or addressed and ‘low level’ concerns were sometimes 
tolerated and underreported.  
There were some similar issues in relation to the private practice of doctors when they worked in other 
organisations. ROs reported that concerns and complaints were not always communicated to them and 
were instead dealt with ‘in-house’. ROs reported difficulties monitoring private practice due to the poor 
flow of information and the reliance on organisations and individual doctors to share information. This 
meant it was difficult for ROs to ensure that revalidation was based on robust appraisals and an assessment 
of the whole scope of practice for doctors who worked privately.    
Respondents reported that there was little or no patient or public involvement (PPI) in revalidation, though 
where there was some involvement, it was most likely to involve contributions to the development of 
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patient feedback and governance in revalidation. Some respondents felt that that PPI could contribute to 
fair and effective revalidation and provide a patient perspective, or a different viewpoint, to medical 
regulation and the processes surrounding revalidation.  However, there were also concerns that PPI was 
difficult to implement for a number of reasons, such as, recruitment, training and retention of appropriate 
individuals, a reluctance to see lay involvement encroach on what some saw as a professional domain, the 
strain it created upon workload and resources, and the limited perceived benefits. 
Implementing medical revalidation is more problematic for some designated bodies, particularly smaller 
ones, and consequently, organisations that provide revalidation services externally have emerged to meet 
the needs of these organisations and individuals. Some smaller designated bodies reported “outsourcing” 
the provisions of appraisal and/or revalidation by contracting with another designated body or with 
individuals to provide these services, and as a consequence, some ROs fulfil this function for more than one 
organisation. Locum agencies typically used external ROs. Services provided included making revalidation 
recommendations, dealing with GMC liaison and fitness to practise referrals or doctors causing concern, 
and organising and undertaking annual appraisals. While outsourcing revalidation made sense for small 
organisations who lacked the appropriate expertise, there were some disadvantages of outsourcing the RO 
function including logistical difficulties, lack of strategic and cultural influence of the RO, and a lack of first-
hand, real-time knowledge that revalidation is being performed to a high standard.  
Respondents described having made incremental revisions and changes to revalidation and appraisal 
systems. These included, updating policies and procedures and implementing IT systems, as well as changes 
to roles and responsibilities for ROs. Other changes included the formalisation of decision making groups, 
and steps to include all groups of doctors in revalidation, particularly those with a more transient or distant 
connection, such as locums. 
In terms of the impact of revalidation, there was a perception that systems such as appraisal, complaints, 
CPD and audit were more robust and effective as a result of revalidation. Furthermore, doctors’ 
engagement with these systems was thought to have improved as result of revalidation. However, a 
minority of respondents remained sceptical about whether revalidation had made an impact on clinical 
practice and suggested it had created new costs and burdens on doctors when existing systems were 
already sufficient. While respondents were able to identify how revalidation had impacted systems and 
engagement, ROs found it more challenging to describe direct impacts on clinical practice, arguing that this 
was a complex and difficult connection to establish, and that changes were slow to come about.  However, 
some respondents described improvements in knowledge, skills and attitudes or behaviour. 
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4.3 The role of Responsible Officers and the changing nature of the medical 
profession 
Our findings suggest that the regulatory focus and statutory responsibilities that characterise the RO role 
mean that those undertaking this work constitute a distinct group of “hybrid professionals”, in that 
responsibility for monitoring the performance of other doctors within organizations has altered the 
professional hierarchy, strengthening a divide between ROs as a ‘governance elite’ group and the ‘rank and 
file’ doctors subject to their oversight. 
Establishing whether ROs use their authority within this restructured hierarchy to preserve collective 
professional autonomy, or whether they operate in support of external standards, acting as a mode of 
professional self-surveillance interpretable as demonstrating governmentality, is complex. In terms of 
professional structure, it is apparent that ROs both distinguish the RO role from other managerial work, and 
that they describe the position of the RO in relation to other groups. Notably, ROs typically described 
themselves as set apart from and above the doctors whose performance they oversee, and explicitly 
characterised the relationship between themselves and other medics within their organization in terms of 
their own authority within that dynamic. However, ROs remain a part of the profession and indeed, their 
eligibility for the role is contingent upon their membership of the profession. It has been argued that the 
complex nature of professional expertise renders it necessary for some tasks to be undertaken by those 
within the profession, and this may be particularly apposite with regards to ‘governance elite’ tasks, with 
evaluating medical performance likely to be challenging to the profession, making professional 
qualifications and expertise requisite to achieve credibility in the eyes of other doctors. However, it is also 
the case that ROs’ status as registered and licensed doctors provides the GMC as regulator with oversight 
over their performance in the role, through both its FTP procedures and through revalidation itself. ROs’ 
clinical credentials, therefore, allow them entry to this elite role group but are also the means through 
which their power is limited, being themselves subject to regulatory authority. 
ROs also described their status in relation to wider healthcare management structures in organizations, 
highlighting that their regulatory responsibilities are conducted in connection with one or more particular 
organizational contexts. In common, therefore, with purely managerial roles, the RO function is 
organizationally situated, meaning that experiences of the role are necessarily shaped by the nature of the 
organization. The way in which ROs make decisions about doctors’ performance, from the information they 
have access to, through to the administrative or financial support available to them, are all mediated by the 
organizational context in which the RO operates.  
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Our findings suggest that the RO has come to embody accountability for medical performance within 
organisations, balancing authority over rank and file doctors with their responsibilities to the GMC as 
external regulator. Revalidation, as on-going process encompassing all doctors, has strengthened 
regulatory oversight, with ROs being the nexus between the organizational, regulatory and professional 
spheres. 
 
4.4 Locum doctors: clinical governance and revalidation 
Our research on the locum medical workforce suggests that the way locums are employed by the NHS may 
be problematic and even potentially detrimental for patient safety. Locums reported not receiving 
adequate induction and experienced poor integration into the organisations where they worked.  We found 
a fairly widespread perception that locums present a greater risk to patient safety. Locums reported that 
they were often regarded negatively by their colleagues and patients, and were perceived as being less 
qualified and less capable than other doctors.   
Locum doctors were thought to be a greater risk than permanent medical staff by some participants for a 
variety of reasons, including a lack of confidence in the robustness of the revalidation processes in locum 
organisations and difficulties overseeing the whole scope of practice for locum doctors. Being on the 
periphery of revalidation had a number of implications for locums, including confusion about how to enact 
the policy, a lack of robust recording and transfer of information systems, difficulties achieving the 
objectives of the policy and a lack of clarity about who was ultimately responsible for locums, including who 
was responsible for bearing the costs of revalidation. There was also a perception that revalidation in locum 
settings was of poorer quality than in NHS settings. A lack of robust oversight of locums meant that it was 
difficult to establish an appraisal record covering the whole scope of practice.  
While revalidation was introduced to provide better assurance and oversight of doctors’ practice, the policy 
is perceived to be more applicable and achievable for doctors who are employedlargely or wholly by one 
employing organisation. There was a perception that locum doctors were not fully considered in the 
development of the policy, and that revalidation was less applicable to locum settings. Locum doctors are 
expected to revalidate in the same way as doctors who are substantively employed by the NHS; however, 
findings indicated that locums face a number of challenges achieving revalidation. Participants perceived 
that locums were less integrated into mainstream clinical practice and experienced barriers to engaging 
with clinical governance and other developmental activities. Locums, and those working to implement 
revalidation in locum settings, described difficulties enacting the revalidation policy, such as, collecting the 
necessary information and engaging in developmental activities required for revalidation. Other difficulties 
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included poor communication and feedback relating to locum practice, and variable quality of governance 
and quality assurance. Consequently, while locums were perceived to be higher risk than employed 
doctors, they were not engaged with revalidation in the same way as doctors working in substantive posts 
in the NHS. 
Furthermore, participants working in NHS organisation reported a lack of robust information from locum 
agencies.  Participants working in the NHS reported that standards of revalidation in locum settings were of 
poorer quality in comparison to NHS settings and were largely reliant on the probity of the locum, rather 
than oversight from colleagues or robust collection of information (such as complaints), meaning it was 
more difficult to establish how safe a locum doctor was. This was accentuated by the ability for locums to 
change their designated body relatively easily. 
 
4.5 Revalidation and the role of designated bodies 
Our research found that employer organisations play an increasingly important intermediary role in the 
relationship between the GMC and individual doctors, enacting regulatory processes on behalf of the GMC 
and extending regulatory surveillance and oversight at local level. On the one hand health care 
organisations have been made accountable for overseeing doctors in a new way, finding that revalidation in 
practice meant they were in many ways themselves experiencing regulation; the operationalisation of 
revalidation meant adhering to requirements set out by the GMC, that for many brought substantial 
changes to governance practice and were potentially costly. On the other hand, they gained new authority 
and leverage over doctors. The ultimate responsibility for revalidation lay with the individual doctor – but 
doctors were made more accountable as a result and more reliant on the organisation that employed 
them. The need for doctors to revalidate and their reliance on organisations to do so thus enabled 
organisations to legitimately increase their over sight of doctors and bring them into organisational 
agendas.  
 
The increased reliance of doctors on organisations for support in enacting the revalidation policy was well 
evidenced by the experience of those who worked outside conventional organisational boundaries, doctors 
who were not employees, or those who had a relatively transient or distant relationship to their employing 
organisation. Due to the lack of organisational support available to such individuals the regulatory 
relationship became increasingly problematic.  
 
Revalidation was experienced as having shifted the regulatory processes ‘upstream’ into the organisational 
sphere. Having provided an opportunity for organisations to expand their surveillance of doctors’ 
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performance through strengthened mechanisms of accountability and increased requirements to 
participate in processes of appraisal, the implementation of revalidation was found to have consequently 
impacted on the position of doctors within the healthcare workforce. In addition to tying doctors more 
closely into organisations’ managerial processes, revalidation was also seen to have brought about some 
evening out of prior hierarchical differences in approaches to managing different professional groups, 
positioning doctors more like other employees. This new accountability doctors experienced had been 
framed, in particular by organisations, the GMC, and doctors in roles contributing to the running of 
revalidation, as part of their professional obligations, but alongside and perhaps in contrast to an apparent 
attentuation of professional autonomy and power. 
 
A shared understanding of the aims of revalidation had been established on the whole across the medical 
profession and by non-clinical staff who were involved in running revalidation systems. Multiple purposes 
were simultaneously identified by most, specifically: patient safety, the identification and support of 
struggling doctors and professional accountability. Many reported that that revalidation had helped in 
some way to meet these aims. Much of the impact attributed to revalidation on the aforementioned 
factors was discussed as occurring as an indirect result of the policy’s introduction by participants. The work 
revalidation required organisations to do on their pre-existing systems, notably tightening and formalising 
clinical governance, triangulation of information collected on doctor performance and communication 
across and between organisation, as well as the increased authority of the RO to manage doctors, were the 
factors seen as most influential in regards to the introduction of revalidation.  
The embedding and acceptance of revalidation was driven by key individuals, specifically the RO and 
revalidation teams within organisations. These roles were valued and seen as key to the success of 
revalidation. A two pronged approach was described as being used in organisations by these key individuals 
to bring about acceptance and ensure all were revalidated; this approach was described as ‘carrot and 
stick’ by some of those interviewed. Revalidation teams (the members of whom varied in number and roles 
across organisations) and ROs provided information, took on the work of making the revalidation process 
as manageable as possible and voiced the benefits of revalidation in attempts to bring about support and 
conformity. This approach appeared successful for the most part. However as a last, though seemingly not 
infrequent, resort the new authority of the RO was described as being used as a stick to bring those not 
engaging into line. Perceptions of revalidation were described as having gradually improved over time, 
though not unanimously, with a minority of doctors noted to still be resistant. A generational difference 
was reported in acceptance of revalidation, with older doctors and those in higher authority positions, 
presented as more likely to be resistant to revalidation and its peer review. The perceived generational 
disparity in attitudes towards revalidation was attributed to difference in training and culture.  
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The impact of revalidation on practice and performance had been thought about and discussed by 
participants and their colleagues but had not been formally assessed in any organisation. In contrast, 
organisational systems were or were planned to be appraised and audited by most. Participants’ narratives 
highlighted a conscious move by organisations towards a focus on the quality of their revalidation systems, 
with assessments and feedback being used to improve them in attempts to make systems more efficient 
and meaningful. Though no formal assessment of revalidation had been undertaken, most did believe 
revalidation worthwhile. This view was the result of perceived improvements to organisations and doctors’ 
practice attributed to revalidation. What these improvements were differed across organisations and job 
roles but can be categorised into eight main areas: continued professional development and keeping 
doctors up to date; the quality of doctors practice and care delivered; reflection – leading to improvements 
in patient safety; the quality of appraisal and the appraisal process; improved information recording and 
flow; communication (within and across organisations); and doctors behaviour to other staff and the 
likelihood of concerns or behavioural difficulties with a doctor being dealt with. 
4.6 Quality and safety systems in healthcare organisations and revalidation 
Our case study interviews revealed a clear perception that revalidation has changed the way in which 
quality and safety data is managed within healthcare organisations. Revalidation has incentivised doctors to 
access quality and safety data, and at the same time organisations have been incentivised to develop 
systems for ensuring that all relevant data feeds into appraisal.   Notably, the focus here mainly centred on 
the use of complaints and serious incidents data, with much less of a focus on clinical audit and quality 
improvement. Importantly, organisations have also developed or maintained systems to ensure that data 
can inform processes related to safety and performance outside of appraisal. This suggests a recognition 
that appraisal may be an appropriate forum for quality improvement through reflection on complaints and 
serious incidents data, but does not negate the need for processes and systems to triangulate that data 
outside of appraisal to alert organisations to potential patient safety concerns and, relatedly, the 
identification of poor medical performance.  
The case study data shows how the formalisation of appraisal has necessitated the development of systems 
for improved information flow and communication, especially in larger organisations. IT systems are 
important for collating data and some organisations are seeking to develop the use of automated systems 
to bring the data together. However, these systems are limited and real time information on quality and 
safety data still require personal communication between senior staff. In many cases, the onus of 
responsibility to bring information into appraisal was on the individual doctor. However, perceived 
weaknesses in this system have engendered a number of processes within organisations to reduce the 
reliance on self-reporting. This was through either directing the flow of information directly to the 
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appraiser, or developing automated systems for collating complaints and serious incidents data in order 
that they are not reliant on the appraisees finding and presenting the information themselves.  
Interviewees noted that for both complaints and SUI data it was often unclear, from the data itself, exactly 
what the doctor’s role was within the incident or complaint. The potential for revalidation to impact 
positively on quality and safety within healthcare organisations, may therefore be dependent on 
improvements to the way in which quality and safety data around serious incidents and complaints is 
reported and investigated.  
4.7 Revalidation and managing concerns about doctors performance 
 
We noted in section 2 that medical revalidation was expected to result in concerns or problems in relation 
to medical performance being raised earlier and dealt with more effectively.  It was suggested that this 
would result in fewer formal cases of serious concern (such as those which culminate in a Fitness to 
Practise hearing following a General Medical Council investigation) and in cases of concern both being 
identified at an earlier stage and more systematically in healthcare organisations and managed more 
promptly with better remediation and prevention strategies.  We explored this through interviews in our 
case study organisations, additional interviews in some NHS England area teams, and a cohort study of 
about 100 anonymised recently closed cases of concerns about general practitioners in five NHS England 
areas. 
We found that in primary care, most concerns are raised as a result of patient complaints, either to the 
GMC or to NHS England.  It was rare for concerns to be raised through the appraisal or revalidation process, 
apart from a very few concerns that related directly to non-engagement in appraisal or revalidation.   
Indeed, some interviewees noted their reluctance to see the “safe space” of confidential appraisal used to 
identify or raise any concerns.     Once a concern had been raised, NHS England guidance on how to manage 
the process was well known and used, though variations in approach were often noted.    We found that 
investigations and further actions (like records audits) quite often uncovered other issues in addition to the 
original concern, which might suggest that many other issues which could be the cause of concern go 
unnoticed or unreported in the absence of a patient complaint.     
 
We found most doctors who were the subject of a concern responded quite constructively to the process, 
accepting the validity of the concern in the main and often seeking out  training or other remediation.   
Those who were compliant in this way tended to see less or no formal action taken as a consequence, even 
if the original cause for concern involved significant patient harm.    When cases were closed, about half 
involved a recommendation that the case should be discussed at the doctor’s next appraisal, though there 
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was no mechanism for checking that happened.    Overall,there was little to suggest that the introduction of 
revalidation had had much direct effect on the identification and management of concerns. 
 
5. The impact and costs of medical revalidation 
 
Our approach to understanding the impact of medical revalidation was set out in section 3.2 of this report, 
where we explained how economic theory could be used to generatethree hypotheses about changes 
which we could then test empirically:  that we would see an improvement in the tail of the performance 
continuum; that there would be a general rightward shift in the performance distribution; and that there 
would be some exit from the workforce from doctors who were either above or below our hypothetical 
performance threshold (see figure 3).   In this section we report on our quantitative analyses directed at 
testing these hypotheses. 
5.1 How much variation in performance measures is attributable to doctors 
and healthcare organisations 
Our first step was to ask how much of the observed variation in performance is attributable to individual 
doctors, or to the healthcare organisations in which they work.   Interventions to improve care quality and 
reduce variation, such as medical revalidation, operate not just at organisational level but at the level of 
individual doctors. In the recent past, a number of initiatives have been introduced with the aim of 
improving hospital specialists’ mortality rates through measurement, public reporting and feedback, most 
notably in cardiac surgery in the UK and US, and in the NHS in England, this has been extended to routine 
publication of outcome data for  consultants (fully-trained hospital specialists) working in various 
specialities. 
We explored these issues in relation to inpatient mortality, emergency re-admission within 28 days of 
discharge and inpatient length of stay. The analysis seeks to answer two questions. First, how much 
variation in observed outcomes can be attributed to individual hospital consultants and how does this 
compare with the variation attributable to the organisations in which they work? Second, are performance 
estimates for individual consultants sufficiently reliable to be useful estimates of their true performance? 
 
We used data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) on all NHS-funded inpatient care provided in hospitals 
in England between April 2010 and February 2013. We focused on six conditions/procedures: emergency 
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admissions for treatment of acute myocardial infarction, acute ischemic stroke, pneumonia and hip 
fracture; and elective admissions for unilateral primary (i.e. non-revision) hip replacement and isolated 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. These groups were constructed following US Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s inpatient quality indicator (IQI) definitions which were recently amended 
for use in England. Patients were excluded if they were younger than 18 years at the time of admission (<40 
years for CABG surgery; <65 for hip fracture) or were living outside of England.   
We found, as figure 4 below shows, that except for length of stay after hip replacement, no more than 11% 
of variation in outcomes can be attributed to doctors and organisations with the rest reflecting random 
chance and unobserved patient factors. Consultant variation exceeds hospital variation by a factor of 1.2 or 
more. However, identifying poor performance amongst consultants is hampered by there usually being 
insufficient numbers of cases per doctor to make reliable estimates of individual performance. Policy 
makers and regulators should therefore be cautious when targeting individual doctors in performance 
improvement initiatives, and we should also be cautious in interpreting such indicators of outcome to 
measure the effects of interventions such as revalidation. 
Figure 4. Proportion of variation attributable to consultants and hospitals; case-mix adjusted 
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5.2 The effect of revalidation on quality of care 
We explored whether hospital consultants’ revalidation was associated with any increase in quality of care, 
as measured by routinely collected indicators. We also explored whether effects vary with previous 
consultant performance (as measured from 2008-10, before the introduction of revalidation) to illuminate 
its effect on ‘poorly performing’ doctors. This retrospective observational study analysed routine 
administrative data from the English Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for all NHS patients receiving care in 
English hospitals during the period 1stApril 2008 to 31th December 2015. We focused on six 
conditions/procedures: emergency admissions for treatment of acute myocardial infarction, acute ischemic 
stroke, pneumonia and hip fracture; and planned admissions for unilateral primary (i.e. non-revision) hip 
replacement and isolated coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. These groups were constructed 
following US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s inpatient quality indicator (IQI) definitions 
(IQI#12, #14, #15, #17, #19, #20), which were recently adapted for use in England. Patients were excluded if 
they were younger than 18 years at the time of admission (<40 years for CABG surgery; <65 for hip 
fracture), were living outside of England, or if information on age, sex or admission details were missing.  
Using established measures of safety and quality of care, based primarily on mortality and readmission 
rates for this set of six conditions/procedures, we found no evidence that revalidation had any effect on the 
quality of care provided by hospital consultants, either overall or in a sub-group of previously defined ‘poor 
performers’. Although all six of our chosen conditions/procedures demonstrated improvements in 
mortality over time, these general trends were not affected by revalidation.  An example of the graphs for 
quality measures in one condition/procedure group – hip replacement – is shown in figure 5 below.  In each 
graph the red vertical line marks the introduction of medical revalidation. 
Figure 5.Quality measures for hip replacement 2008-2015 
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The analysis has strengths over and above a traditional interrupted time series. Rather than taking a single 
intervention point (national introduction of the policy) this analysis uses the fact that revalidation was 
implemented gradually, and the detail permitted by linking HES data with information from the GMC. 
Doctors were issued with different revalidation dates and although these were not random we can exploit 
this variation to estimate robustly the effect of the policy, reducing the risk of confounding by other events.  
Limitations to the analysis include the imperfect measurement of quality and case-mix adjustment available 
in routinely collected data. In particular, although HES permits measurement of co-morbid conditions 
(through secondary diagnosis codes and observation of prior hospital admissions), it is limited in its capacity 
to measure severity of condition, or clinical details which may affect patient outcomes (e.g. acute 
myocardial infarction with or without ST elevation). 
Our findings are perhaps unsurprising given the relatively small proportion of variation in outcomes that 
can be attributed to doctors (see section 5.1 above). The findings do not preclude improvements in 
outcomes resulting in future, as revalidation becomes embedded and potentially changes the culture of 
medical professionalism, encouraging self-awareness, reflection and continuing professional development, 
as well as strengthening existing systems of clinical governance.  Revalidation is part of a much wider 
quality assurance system within the NHS, which may be contributing to a general quality improvement as 
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illustrated by reducing mortality over time as the graph in figure 5 shows. It may also in time contribute to 
maintaining trust in the medical profession and assuring the public that doctors are up-to-date and fit to 
practise.  At this time, however, we were unable to demonstrate any improvement in quality of care 
resulting from revalidation. 
5.3 The effect of revalidation on the consultant workforce 
Preliminary qualitative evidence and theoretical predictions (see figure 3 in section 3) suggested that 
revalidation may have increased the rate at which doctors leave the profession, so we aimed to explore 
whether quantitative data supported this assertion. 
Figures released by the General Medical Council noted that in the three years before the introduction of 
revalidation (November 2009 to December 2012), 7,994 doctors relinquished their licence to practice, and 
in three and a half years following its introduction (December 2012 to July 2016) this figure was 33,148 
(+256%). It is important to note that this may not be actively practising doctors leaving the profession: 
many doctors who no longer practice may have kept a licence for various reasons, and they are likely to 
have been prompted to relinquish this by the introduction of revalidation. From the GMC register there is 
no way of separating practising clinicians from those who no longer practise but retained a licence.  
We analysed activity data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for all consultants in English hospitals from 
April 2009 to March 2016 (n=19,334).   Consultants were deemed to be clinically active at any given date if 
they took responsibility for at least one full consultant episode (FCE) on this or any subsequent date until 
the end of the data period (31st March 2016). Consultants were also deemed to be clinically active until the 
end of the data period if we found them to be employed by an NHS organisation in February 2017 (from 
the most recent available electronic staff record), which helps to account for absences due to, for example, 
maternity leave or research leave.  Linking HES data with information from the GMC register we estimated 
semi-parametric Cox models to test whether consultants became more likely to cease clinical activity after 
the introduction of mandatory revalidation. Crucially, consultants underwent revalidation at different times 
and we differentiate periods when they were a) not subject to revalidation, b) awaiting a revalidation 
recommendation, c) after their revalidation had been deferred, and d) after they had received a positive 
recommendation.  We also used difference-in-difference methods to compare the performance (as proxied 
by 30-day mortality rates) of those who ceased practice and who remained in practice before and after the 
introduction of revalidation. 
19,334 consultants were followed for a total of 44.4 million days. The median follow-up was 2,465 days, 
around 6.7 years (mean = 2,298 days, 2.3 years). Approximately 17.9% of consultants (n=3,452) ceased to 
    
Page 31 
 
be clinically active before the end of the data analysis period. Of these, 19.9% (n=689) had received a 
positive revalidation recommendation prior to exit.  Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function and 
the associated hazard function for the cohort of consultants. The vertical dashed line indicates the 
introduction of medical revalidation in December 2012. 
Figure 6. Kaplan-Meier survival function and hazard function
 
For the cohort as a whole, the proportion of consultants who received a positive revalidation 
recommendation increased steadily by approximately 1.9%per month after the policy introduction and 
reached 85.3% by December 2015. ROs issued a recommendation to defer or reported non-engagement for 
1,816 consultants, of which 1,278 subsequently received a positive recommendation. The median deferral 
period was 147 days (interquartile range = 113 to 273). 
Consultants that ceased clinical activity before the end of the follow-up period were less likely to have 
received a positive revalidation recommendation than the overall cohort of consultants in our study (38.2% 
vs. 86.0%). The proportion of consultants ceasing practice after a decision had been deferred is similar to 
that measured at the end of follow-up (3.9% vs. 2.0%).  
Consultants awaiting their first revalidation recommendation were at higher risk of exit than before they 
become subject to revalidation (HR: 2.33; 95% CI: 2.12 to 2.57), and the hazard further increased after a 
recommendation to defer or a report of non-engagement (HR: 3.51; 95% CI 2.71 to 4.55) (𝜒2(1) = 10.19; 
p=0.001). A positive recommendation was also associated with an increased risk of exit compared with pre-
policy levels (HR: 1.85; 95% CI: 1.65 to 2.06) but the hazard was statistically significantly lower than while 
awaiting the first revalidation meeting (𝜒2(1) = 24.36; p<0.001). 
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Figure 7 shows risk-adjusted 30-day mortality rates for ‘leavers’ and ‘stayers’ before and after the 
introduction of medical revalidation, by speciality and admission type. . For one group (elective surgical 
admissions) mortality rates improved over time for patients treated by ‘stayers’ but remained largely 
constant for patients treated by ‘leavers’, thus suggesting an increasing performance gap between these 
groups. None of the differences remain statistically significant once we apply a Bonferroni correction to 
counteract the problem of multiple comparisons.  
Figure 7. 30-day mortality rates (95% CI) of stayers and leavers before and after the introduction of 
medical revalidation 
 
5.4 Revisiting the Department of Health impact assessment for revalidation 
To explore the likely costs, cost savings and measurable benefits of revalidation we used as a basis the 
Department of Health’s impact assessment for revalidation produced in 2012. We reviewed the 
assumptions made in the DH impact assessment, updating them wherever possible with information that 
has emerged since these predictions, from our research and from other sources, and we considered areas 
of uncertainty which may only be determined in the future, over a longer timescale. 
The main categories of costs set out in the DH economic model in 2012 were the direct costs of revalidation 
– essentially the additional time costs of doctors and responsible officers in preparing for and conducting 
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appraisal and revalidation. Our partner project, funded by the GMC and undertaken by the  UMbRELLA 
consortium, along with this project’s surveys of responsible officers (see section 4.1 and 4.2) provide 
additional information on the actual time spent and the implied costs. Set up and maintenance cost of the 
regulation system can be estimated from GMC published annual reports.  In summary, we found in some 
instances the original cost estimates were perhaps conservative (particularly in terms of doctors’ time 
spent on appraisal, which DH assumed to reduce following revalidation, and our surveys found to have 
generally increased), but overall they were not unreasonable.  
There are a number of potential benefits of revalidation. The DH case identified as a benefit public 
assurance in the medical profession but did not make any attempt to quantify it. We reviewed surveys of 
public trust in professions (data is available annually from Ipsos Mori), which demonstrated trust in the 
medical profession to be high and largely unchanged over recent years,  but this is a small sample and 
should be viewed with caution.  
The main benefits identified by DH related to improving patient safety and improving care quality and 
patient outcomes. In our project, we estimated improvements in patient safety and hospital quality using a 
variety of indicators (see section 5.2). DH assumed that 3.7 million patients would benefit by half a day’s 
QALY, which we are unable to substantiate. We used indicators of patient safety and hospital quality 
created by the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (see section 5.2), observing these 
over time. The first revalidation date for each consultant was used as an intervention point with a multi-
level interrupted time series approach to attribute any change in trends to the revalidation process.  As 
there were no apparent improvements in estimates of quality or outcomes of care, we did not substantiate 
the QALY gains that were suggested by the DH impact assessment.  Similarly we monitored activity rates 
per month per consultant from HES data to observe any trends in ‘productivity’ associated with 
revalidation, but in a simple interrupted time series analysis (using December 2012 as the intervention 
point) we found no change attributable to revalidation.  
The DH impact assessment makes a number of assumptions around predicted reductions in suspensions 
and litigation costs. We believe that the lag between an incident and these sanctions is likely to be too long 
for it to be reasonable to observe benefits within the timescale of this project, so cannot support or refute 
these assumptions.  
In summary, by revisiting the DH impact assessment we found in some instances cost estimates perhaps 
conservative, but overall not unreasonable. In contrast, we could not support any of the assumed benefits 
in the DH model, so we find their overall estimate (that benefits would exceed costs within an eight-year 
timescale) optimistic. There are areas of further potential long-term benefit set out in the DH impact 
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assessment where there are plausible reasons to expect changes but not within the timescale of this 
project (e.g. litigation costs, which are highly lagged). These may provide opportunities for future research. 
But, on the basis of current evidence, we cannot demonstrate that medical revalidation as implemented is 
a cost-effective policy intervention. 
 
6. Conclusions and reflections 
 
Our research, summarised in this report and described in much more detail in the accompanying working 
papers, shows that the introduction of medical revalidation has fundamentally changed the way that the 
medical profession is regulated in the United Kingdom, creating a new tripartite relationship between the 
General Medical Council, organisations which employ or contract with doctors, and the medical profession 
(individually and collectively).  We describe this as an employer-mediated professional regulatory regime.    
It has required many healthcare organisations to strengthen (or establish) systems for clinical governance 
and their oversight of medical performance.   
 
Overall, we find that the implementation of medical revalidation and the many organisational and 
professional changes associated with it has been achieved.   It has been easiest to implement in quite large 
healthcare organisations (like NHS trusts) where the capacity and capability for clinical governance already 
existed or could be provided, and where most doctors have a fairly straightforward employed relationship 
with the organisation.  It has been more problematic in smaller healthcare organisations (like hospices or 
private healthcare providers which lacked capacity and capability in clinical governance), in primary care 
(where NHS England area teams have been expected to manage revalidation for very large numbers of GPs 
without the supporting governance infrastructures found in NHS trusts) and for doctors whose relationship 
to organisations is generally more distant or transient. 
 
We find that “designated bodies” (the formal term for organisations which employ or contract with 
doctors) and Responsible Officers have been crucial to the implementation of revalidation, though the 
corporate accountability of designated bodies for revalidation is not well defined.  Other areas of concern 
include the oversight of locum doctors and of doctors working in private practice, and of doctors who move 
frequently between healthcare organisations.   In these groups, it is often not clear who is responsible for 
appraisal, revalidation and remediation or how these processes should be resourced.    Paradoxically, 
strengthened clinical governance in many healthcare organisations could encourage some doctors to move 
to these settings where there is less effective oversight of clinical practice.   
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We found many examples of changes and improvements in clinical governance and clinical practice 
reported by Responsible Officers, particularly in relation to doctors whose practice gives cause for concern 
or where there are problems or concerns about the quality of care.   But it was less clear that revalidation 
had had much impact on the majority of doctors whose performance is good, in supporting or stimulating 
further improvement. Measuring the impact of medical revalidation quantitatively is difficult, and we found 
no significant changes in a number of quantitative measures of quality before and after the introduction of 
revalidation for a variety of condition/procedure groups.   We did find that the likelihood of consultant 
medical staff leaving the workforce increased significantly as a result of revalidation.  We also found that 
there were significant differences in performance on mortality between consultants who stayed in and left 
the workforce after the introduction of revalidation. 
 
The Department of Health’s own impact assessment from 2012 predicted the costs of medical revalidation 
conservatively, and was very overoptimistic about the benefits to be realised in this first cycle.  Some of the 
benefits predicted may only be measurable over a longer time period that this research allowed. 
 
We conclude that the relatively generic, “one size fits all” revalidation model adopted for its introduction 
had the advantage of simplicity, especially in the first cycle of revalidation where relatively little data about 
the likely outcomes of revalidation was available.   However, this generic model is inherently inefficient, 
and it would be preferable to tailor the future use of revalidation to take greater account of factors such as 
specialty/clinical service area, work environment/organisational setting, and prior performance. 
 
Our key findings are: 
 Overall, the implementation of medical revalidation and the many organisational and professional 
changes associated with it has been achieved, at around the costs anticipated by the Department of 
Health.   We found while there was initial resistance to and concern about medical revalidation, that 
has largely reduced as doctors and healthcare organisations have engaged with its practical 
implementation constructively, though there is significant residual scepticism about the process and its 
benefits. 
 Revalidation as it was designed has been easiest to implement in quite large healthcare organisations 
(like NHS trusts) where the capacity and capability for clinical governance already existed or could be 
provided, and where most doctors have a fairly straightforward employed relationship with the 
organisation. 
 Revalidation has been more problematic to implement in smaller healthcare organisations (like 
hospices or private healthcare providers which lacked capacity and capability in clinical governance), in 
primary care (where NHS England area teams have been expected to manage revalidation for very large 
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numbers of GPs without the supporting governance infrastructures found in NHS trusts) and for doctors 
whose relationship to organisations is generally more distant or transient. 
 The role of “designated bodies” (the formal term for organisations which employ or contract with 
doctors) and of Responsible Officers has been crucial to the effective implementation of revalidation.  
Although the regulations give significant statutory responsibilities to Responsible Officers, who are 
accountable professionally, as doctors, to the General Medical Council, they do not provide for the 
corporate accountability of designated bodies for revalidation, or provide any powers for the GMC or 
others to determine which organisations have the capacity to become or remain a designated body. 
 Particular areas of concern include the oversight of locum doctors and of doctors working in private 
practice, and of doctors who move frequently between healthcare organisations.   In these groups, it is 
often not clear who is responsible for appraisal, revalidation and remediation or how these processes 
should be resourced.    The sharing of information about appraisal and revalidation for these doctors 
between organisations is generally quite limited.  Paradoxically, strengthened clinical governance in 
many healthcare organisations could encourage some doctors to move to these settings where there is 
less effective oversight of clinical practice. 
 Our research finds many examples of changes and improvements in clinical governance and clinical 
practice reported by Responsible Officers, particularly in relation to doctors whose practice gives cause 
for concern or where there are problems or concerns about the quality of care.   It is less clear that 
revalidation has had much impact on the majority of doctors whose performance is good, in supporting 
or stimulating further improvement. 
 We describe the model of revalidation implemented to date as generic, by which we mean that the 
process is intended to be applicable to all doctors regardless of speciality, work setting, prior 
performance and other characteristics.   We think that this “one size fits all” model had the advantage 
of simplicity, especially in the first cycle of revalidation where relatively little data about the likely 
outcomes of revalidation was available.   However, a generic model is inherently inefficient, and it 
would be preferable to tailor the future use of revalidation to take greater account of factors such as 
specialty/service type, work environment/organisation, and prior performance. 
 Measuring the impact of medical revalidation quantitatively is difficult, not least because much 
performance variation does not related to doctors individually or to organisations.   We found no 
significant changes in a number of quantitative measures of quality attributable to revalidation for a 
variety of condition/procedure groups.   We did find that the likelihood of consultant medical staff 
leaving the workforce increased significantly as a result of revalidation.  We also found that there were 
significant differences in performance on mortality between consultants who stayed in and left the 
workforce after the introduction of revalidation. 
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The Department of Health’s own impact assessment from 2012 predicted the costs of medical revalidation 
conservatively, and was overoptimistic about the benefits to be realised in this first cycle.  Some of the 
benefits predicted are likely only to be measurable over a longer time period that this research allowed. 
But, on the basis of current evidence, we cannot demonstrate that medical revalidation as implemented is 
a cost-effective policy intervention. 
 
The General Medical Council commissioned a review of medical revalidation from Sir Keith Pearson, which 
was published in early 2017, and has just published an action plan in response to that review.  From our 
research, we would suggest four main areas in which future improvements to medical revalidation might 
concentrate: 
 
 Healthcare organisations (“designated bodies” as they are referred to in the regulations) are crucial to 
the effective use of medical revalidation, but they vary hugely in size, capability and capacity, and 
approaches to medical revalidation.   At the moment there is no mechanism for determining what 
organisations can or should take on this statutory role.  In theory at least, any organisation which 
employs or contracts with a doctor or doctors can be a designated body, though some organisations 
(NHS trusts for example) are required to be designated bodies by the regulations.   Neither the GMC 
nor the Department of Health seems to have formal responsibility for maintaining a list of designated 
bodies.   We suggest that a central authority should have statutory responsibility for setting the criteria 
or requirements to be met in order to be a designated body, determining whether an organisation 
fulfils those requirements, and maintaining the register or list of designated bodies.   
 Doctors who do not work in a conventional, employed relationship for one large healthcare 
organisation or designated body are not well served by the current arrangements for medical 
revalidation.   This includes locums, doctors in private practice, doctors with no “prescribed 
connection” to a designated body, and arguably doctors in general practice who are all revalidated by 
NHS England.   We suggest that new arrangements for the oversight of doctors in these groups are 
needed, which take greater account of the relatively limited clinical governance infrastructure around 
them.   It may be that some organisations not currently acting as designated bodies (CCGs or GP 
federations for example in primary care) should take on that role.  
 A substantial amount of information about appraisal and revalidation is collected at an organisational 
level, but virtually none of it – beyond the revalidation recommendation – is held by the General 
Medical Council, and information is not reliably shared when doctors move between organisations.  In 
Scotland and Wales there are  information systems for appraisal and revalidation (MARS and SOAR) for 
all doctors in those two countries.  We suggest that the use of a single information system could make 
appraisal and revalidation more efficient for doctors and designated bodies, support information 
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sharing when doctors move from one organisation to another or work for multiple organisations, and 
make it more feasible for appraisal and revalidation to cover doctors’ whole scope of practice.  It would 
also help to support doctors who, as noted above, do not work within a single designated body and its 
clinical governance infrastructure. 
 We have noted that the current generic model of revalidation takes little account of differences 
between doctors’ areas of clinical practice or their specialty, organisational context, or prior or current 
performance.  We argued that generic regulatory interventions tend, by their very nature, to be quite 
inefficient, and we noted that the impact to date of revalidation seems to have been largely at the 
lower end of the performance continuum.  We suggest that revalidation could be made a more flexible 
process, with greater capacity for designated bodies and their Responsible Officers to be responsive to 
differences in specialty/clinical practice area, organisational/work context, and performance. 
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Appendix A.  List of accompanying working papers 
 
The table below lists the sixteen working papers which accompany this overview report.  Each working 
paper is designed to be a self-standing paper, capable of being read and used independently, and each 
focused on a particular area of interest or concern.  Some were produced for our interim report in 2016.  A 
number of them will go on to be published, often in edited form, as academic journal papers, and this is 
noted as appropriate in the table. 
 
Number 
 
Title 
1 How medical revalidation could change medical performance: a literature review and 
conceptual model. 
2 A policy review of the formation and implementation of medical revalidation in England 
3 The evolving purposes of medical revalidation in the United Kingdom: a qualitative study of 
professional and regulatory narratives (accepted for publication in Academic Medicine) 
4 The implementation of medical revalidation: an assessment using normalisation process 
theory (accepted for publication in BMC Health Services Research) 
5 Implementing medical revalidation: organisational changes and impacts – findings from a 
survey of Responsible Officers in 2015  
 
(published as: Walshe K, Bryce M, Luscombe K, Tazzyman A, Tredinnick-Rowe J, Archer J. 
Implementing medical revalidation in the United Kingdom: findings about organisational 
changes and impacts from a survey of Responsible Officers. Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, 2017; 110(1): 23-30.  DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0141076816683556). 
 
6 Implementing medical revalidation – findings from a survey of Responsible Officers in 
2016/17 
7 Policing the profession? Regulatory reform, restratification and the emergence of 
Responsible Officers as a new locus of power in UK medicine 
8 Implementing revalidation in the locum medical workforce 
9 Reforming regulatory relationships: the impact of medical revalidation on interactions 
between doctors, employer organisations and the General Medical Council 
10 Implementing revalidation – from policy to practice: an assessment using normalisation 
process theory 
11 Revalidation and its impact on systems for quality and safety within organisations 
12 Medical revalidation and the management of doctors causing concern 
13 Should interventions to reduce variation in care quality target doctors or hospitals? (under 
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review by Health Policy) 
14 The effect of medical revalidation on patient outcomes and quality of care 
15 Does regulation encourage doctors to leave practice? Analysis of routine hospital data in 
the English NHS following the introduction of medical revalidation 
16 Costs and consequences of medical revalidation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
